Following the latest outbreak of clashes between Hamas—the Palestinian quasi-state terrorist organisation—and Israel, a ceasefire was agreed that few believe will endure. For Hamas, this truce is merely a tactical pause in its violent campaign against Israel. Israel, too, does not expect it to last—not out of unwillingness, but because it knows Hamas will inevitably provoke retaliation. By itself, Hamas does not pose an insurmountable threat to Israel. What complicates matters is the material and financial backing Hamas receives from Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. While the role of these states is well documented, another player—Pakistan—has long escaped scrutiny. Recent revelations by a former Pakistani minister about Islamabad’s training of Palestinian militants have forced observers to pay attention to Pakistan’s murky role in Middle Eastern unrest.
Ideological and Organisational Links
The ideological roots of Hamas are organically connected to Pakistan’s jihadist orientation. Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, while Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami represents the ideological nucleus of Pakistani jihadism. These two are cut from the same cloth. This shared ideological foundation has fostered ties between Hamas and the Pakistani state. But beyond ideological affinity, Hamas fits neatly into Pakistan’s strategy of projecting influence beyond the limits imposed by its geography, economy, and capacity. Unable to act as a conventional power, Islamabad—more accurately, Rawalpindi, where real strategic decisions are made—leans on asymmetric methods to extend its reach while maintaining plausible deniability.
Pakistani Footprints in Global Jihad
Hamas is not the only terrorist outfit with which Pakistan has cultivated links. Pakistani terrorist groups with connections to the “deep state” have long surfaced in the Middle East. Around 2015–16, reports emerged of Pakistani fighters joining ISIS in Syria; a training camp there was even named after Abdul Rashid Ghazi of Lal Masjid notoriety. Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammed was active in East Africa, while Pakistani operatives were spotted in Sudan and the Bosnian conflict. More recently, Pakistani auxiliaries reportedly fought alongside Azeri forces against Armenia. Pakistan has leveraged its ties with Turkey and Qatar to insert itself into these theatres.
Whenever such links are exposed, Islamabad falls back on the excuse of “private individuals” acting independently. But this line is unconvincing: those joining groups opposed to Pakistan’s interests face harsh crackdowns, as illustrated by the fate of Shia Pakistanis suspected of connections to Iran-backed groups such as the Zainabiyoun Brigade.
Support for Hamas: From Covert to Public
Pakistan’s ties with Hamas date back to the period of international sanctions against the group, when Islamabad offered $3 million in aid for the Palestinian Authority, implicitly benefiting Hamas. Since then, relations have deepened. Pakistan’s limited capacity restricts financial and material aid, but it offers training and, potentially, manpower for Hamas’s jihad against Israel.
Direct access to Gaza has remained difficult, with Egypt keeping a tight rein on supply routes. Pakistani “humanitarian aid” attempts have frequently been blocked. Thus, official contact with Hamas is carefully concealed, often channelled through Qatar and Turkey, while Jordan facilitates links with the Palestinian Authority.
Despite avoiding overt ties, Pakistan has become ever more vocal in championing the Palestinian cause—a proxy for supporting Hamas. Islamist organisations such as Jamaat-e-Islami openly back Hamas without restraint. At a recent Jamaat rally in Peshawar, a recorded message from Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was broadcast, thanking Pakistan for its support and urging Imran Khan to take “practical steps” for Palestine. Haniyeh declared Pakistan an active partner in Hamas’s “victory” over Israel, underscoring the extent of the nexus.
Yet history offers a sobering reminder: Palestinians are pawns for Pakistan. In 1970, Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq—later the dictator and champion of political Islam—massacred more than 20,000 Palestinians in Jordan during Black September, when it suited Islamabad’s interests. Pakistan has never hesitated to abandon its “Islamic brothers” when expedient.
Strategic Calculations in the Middle East
The Hamas connection also aligns with Pakistan’s broader strategic agenda. Islamabad is carefully positioning itself alongside Turkey, Qatar, and Iran—all Hamas backers and rivals of the Saudi-led bloc. While wary of antagonising Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on whom its economy depends, Pakistan is quietly building leverage with other regional players.
Its activism on Palestine—amplifying the issue at the UN in New York and co-sponsoring resolutions against Israel at the UNHRC in Geneva—has served as a power play aimed at shaming Saudi Arabia and the UAE for their pragmatic moves towards normalisation with Israel. By taking an uncompromising line, Pakistan seeks to bolster its image on the Arab street, applying indirect pressure on Arab governments while polishing its credentials as the self-proclaimed “sword-arm of the Ummah”.
Conclusion: A Dangerous Nexus
Pakistan’s relationship with Hamas is moving into a new phase, where ideology, strategy, and opportunism converge. For Islamabad, the Palestinian cause is less about principle than about leverage: a bargaining chip to elevate its role in the Islamic world, pressure Arab benefactors, and link Palestine to Kashmir in order to sustain both issues on the global agenda.
But this dangerous game carries immense risks—not only for the Middle East but for Pakistan itself. By embedding itself deeper into Hamas’s orbit, Pakistan is once again playing with fire: exporting instability abroad while inflaming radicalism at home.