The Taliban, who seized power in Afghanistan last month, have rushed to form a ‘caretaker’ government. Three weeks after storming into Kabul, the movement has awarded the most important positions to religious hardliners and foot soldiers—choices facilitated by the careful midwifing of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Hand in the Power Balance
Pakistan’s influence is unmistakable. Field commanders, particularly from the Kandahar-based Quetta Shura, have outmanoeuvred the political wing that negotiated the Doha pact with the United States in February 2020. Those talks, which dragged on for 17 months, secured the Taliban international legitimacy while violence continued on the ground.
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, co-founder of the movement and relative of the late Mullah Omar, and Mullah Sher Mohammed Abbas Stanakzai, long the Taliban’s ‘foreign face’, have both been side-lined. Baradar is deeply distrusted by Pakistan, which imprisoned him between 2011 and 2018 for attempting talks with then-President Hamid Karzai. Stanakzai’s Indian military training has also counted against him, fuelling suspicions in Pakistani security circles despite his appeals to India not to close its Kabul mission.
A Supreme Leader and His Apparatus
At the top sits the reclusive Amir ul-Momineen, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, echoing Iran’s model of ultimate authority vested in a religious figure above politics.
As acting Prime Minister, the Taliban have appointed Mullah Mohammad Hasan Akhund, a respected figure from the Quetta Shura and a descendant of Ahmed Shah Durrani, founder of modern Afghanistan. In a society rooted in semi-feudal traditions, such pedigree carries weight. Yet Akhund is remembered as the man who ordered the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001, casting doubt on assurances that ethnic and religious minorities will be protected under Taliban rule.
The clear ‘strongman’, however, is Sirajuddin Haqqani, now Interior Minister. A long-time favourite of Pakistan’s ISI, Haqqani has overseen suicide bombings and targeted assassinations at Islamabad’s behest. His appointment—rumoured to have been finalised during ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed’s visit to Kabul days before the announcement—cements the power of the Haqqani Network. With his brothers Khalilur Rahman and Anas also holding influential roles, the Network has emerged as the Taliban’s most potent militia force within the state.
Sanctions, Symbolism and Exclusion
Most ministers in the new cabinet remain under UN sanctions, yet the Taliban appear unbothered. Their message to the international community is blunt: take it or leave it. The process of lifting sanctions will become a pressing diplomatic issue.
The new army chief is a cleric with no formal rank or professional military background, underscoring both the Taliban’s distrust of former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces officers and their determination to consolidate authority internally.
Despite promises of inclusivity, no women feature in the interim government. Nor have Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Hazaras been meaningfully represented. Token appointments may follow, but the real power structure is clear: clerics, commanders, and loyalists dominate.
Recognition and Regional Dynamics
International recognition is the Taliban’s immediate concern. On 8 September, Pakistan, China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan held a virtual meeting to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Russia was notably absent, with President Putin adopting a more cautious line.
As Dawn noted in its editorial of 8 September:
“The key question confronting the Taliban now is that of international recognition. Taliban officials have said they want ‘strong and healthy’ relations with other states. However, this is contingent on a number of things.”
Among these, respect for fundamental rights—particularly women’s rights—and action against foreign terrorists are paramount. Failure to deliver on these promises risks prolonging the Taliban’s diplomatic isolation.
Factional Tensions Ahead
Analysts warn that the Taliban face internal risks as well. Zahid Hussain, author of No-Win War: The Paradox of US–Pakistan Relations in Afghanistan’s Shadow, highlights the divide between the old guard, who led negotiations in Doha, and younger field commanders hardened in battle since 2001. These newer leaders hold uncompromising views, and with no absolute authority in place, factional power struggles are inevitable.
Conclusion
The Taliban’s new order is dominated by hardliners and shadowed by Pakistan’s influence. Promises of inclusivity and reform ring hollow as power consolidates in the hands of clerics, commanders, and sanctioned militants. The coming weeks will reveal whether the Taliban can maintain unity, secure recognition, and temper their ideological rigidity—or whether Afghanistan is destined for renewed isolation and internal strife.